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AbsTrACT
Introduction In response to the 2013–2016 West African 
outbreak of the Ebola virus disease (EVD), Public Health 
England introduced enhanced screening at major UK ports 
of entry. Our aim was to explore screeners’ and screened 
travellers’ perceptions of screening as part of an evaluation 
of the screening programme.
Methods We undertook qualitative focus groups and 
semistructured interviews with screeners and travellers 
who had returned from affected countries before and 
after the introduction of screening in England. The study 
was conducted in two airports: one international rail 
terminal and one military airport. Research topic guides 
explored perceptions of the purpose and implementation 
of the process, potential improvements and reactions to 
screening. The data were analysed using the framework 
method.
results Twenty-four screeners participated in 4 focus 
groups (one for each port of entry) and 23 travellers 
participated in interviews. Three themes are presented: 
‘Context’, ‘Screeners’ experience of the programme’ and 
‘Screening purpose and experiences’. The programme 
was implemented rapidly, refined over time and adapted 
to individual ports. Screeners reported diverse experiences 
of screening including negative impacts on their normal 
roles, difficult interactions with passengers and pressure 
to identify positive EVD cases. Screening was considered 
unlikely to identify individuals with symptoms of EVD, and 
some participants suggested it was driven by political 
concerns rather than empirical evidence. The screening 
process was valued for its provision of information and 
reassurance.
Conclusion This qualitative study found that the UK 
EVD screening process was perceived to be acceptable 
to assess individual risk and provide information and 
advice to travellers. Future programmes should have 
clear objectives and streamlined processes to minimise 
disruption, tailored to the nature of the threat and 
developed with the needs of humanitarian workers as well 
as general travellers in mind.
InTroduCTIon
The 2013–2016 West African outbreak of 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) was the largest 
since the discovery of the virus in 1976,1 
with more cases and deaths than all other 
outbreaks combined.2 UK healthcare and 
military volunteers supported the response 
primarily in Sierra Leone, with Guinea and 
Liberia also significantly affected.
The West African EVD outbreak was 
declared a public health emergency of inter-
national concern by the WHO on 8 August 
2014. Some direct flights to the UK from the 
region had been discontinued by airline oper-
ators before this date: all were discontinued 
on 27 August 2014. Public Health England 
(PHE) introduced enhanced screening for 
EVD on 14 October 2014 at major ports 
of entry in England as part of activities in 
response to the risk to public health. Prior to 
this date, people returning to England from 
EVD affected countries were not routinely 
identified on entry to the UK. Travellers 
were advised to seek medical attention as 
soon as possible if they developed any symp-
toms compatible with EVD via information 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► Public Health England introduced enhanced screen-
ing to assess the health status of persons return-
ing from Ebola virus disease-affected countries and 
ensure they were aware of what actions to take if 
subsequently taken unwell.
What are the new findings?
 ► Differential views were elicited between the intend-
ed purpose of screening, the experience of those re-
ceiving screening and the outcomes achieved.
 ► The screening programme was viewed as accept-
able to screeners and screened travellers; however, 
the experience and perceived needs of healthcare 
workers taking part in the humanitarian response 
can differ from that of general travellers.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Future programmes should have clear objectives 
from the start and processes streamlined to mini-
mise disruption, tailored to the nature of the threat 
and, where safe, developed with stakeholder expe-
rience in mind.
 ► Future programmes should consider the specific 
needs of healthcare workers taking part in the hu-
manitarian response as well as general travellers.
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provided in the media, PHE’s website, notices at ports 
of entry and travel companies. Advice from occupational 
health teams before departure and varied systems for 
supervision on return were also provided by some organi-
sations (eg, non-governmental organisations). Enhanced 
screening was introduced to: provide information to 
persons returning from EVD affected countries, assess 
their health status and ensure they were aware of what 
actions to take if subsequently taken unwell.3 4 Although 
the detection of large numbers of EVD cases was not 
anticipated, screening was introduced both to advise trav-
ellers and to provide a degree of reassurance for the UK 
public.5
Entry screening involved completion of a questionnaire 
assessing health and travel history, potential risk of EVD 
exposure via occupation and contact with infected indi-
viduals,6 assignment of a risk category (0=low to 3=high) 
(table 1) and tympanic temperature measurement. 
Screeners provided advice to all travellers including 
actions to take if symptoms developed. Category 0 trav-
ellers were provided with reassurance and advice to 
continue with their routine activities. Category 1 travel-
lers were additionally advised to take their temperature if 
they felt unwell and to phone the National Health Service 
(NHS) telephone helpline if it was ≥37.5°C. If EVD signs 
or symptoms were observed or disclosed, travellers were 
assessed by a clinical screener who determined the need 
for referral to specialist care.6 Category 2 travellers were 
provided with a monitoring kit and asked to record their 
temperature twice daily during the 21-day period since 
the last day in an EVD-affected country (used as a proxy 
measure for last exposure to risk) and report if they felt 
unwell or had a temperature of ≥37.5°C. Category 3 trav-
ellers were also provided with a monitoring kit and asked 
to record their temperature twice daily, additionally 
having to report their temperature to PHE by midday.7
Two sources of information were used to identify 
eligible travellers: the Returning Healthcare Workers 
(HCWs) Scheme (RHWS) and Advanced Passenger 
Information (API). The RHWS involved organisations 
registering with PHE and providing details of deployed 
individuals’ return dates. API includes the passengers’ 
full name, date of birth, gender, nationality and passport 
number and is collected by airlines prior to travel either 
when a flight is booked or automatically through passport 
details obtained at check-in. API enabled the pre-entry 
identification of most eligible travellers expected on each 
flight. Self-identification was relied on to detect eligible 
travellers not identified via RHWS or API. As none of 
these systems were 100% effective, it was assumed that 
not all eligible travellers would be identified.
It is important to understand how screening 
programmes are experienced by those delivering and 
receiving them to ensure that the design and implemen-
tation of similar initiatives in the future are acceptable 
and adhered to. The aim of this paper is to explore 
screeners’ and screened travellers’ perceptions of this 
EVD screening programme.
MeTHods
research design
JMK undertook qualitative focus groups (May–August 
2015) with screeners implementing screening processes 
(eg, taking temperatures, administering questionnaires 
and undertaking clinical assessments). Focus groups 
are useful for conducting exploratory investigations 
into emerging areas of interest and provide a relatively 
efficient data collection method. Interactions between 
participants generate new information as participants 
build on the responses of others and focus groups facil-
itate insights into the extent to which the experience of 
screeners agree or diverge.
JMK conducted semistructured one-to-one interviews 
(August–November 2015) with travellers who were 
referred for further investigation of febrile illness after 
returning to the UK from affected countries prior to the 
introduction of screening and screened travellers (here-
after referred to as prescreening and postscreening). 
CC conducted one interview. As travellers’ places of 
residence were geographically widespread, one-to-one 
interviews were conducted by telephone. Additionally, 
the experiences of passengers were expected to be more 
diverse than screeners (who were following a protocol); 
therefore, one-to-one interviews were appropriate.
The evaluation was conducted at two airports (ports 1 
and 3), one international rail terminal (port 2) and one 
military airfield (port 4), chosen to reflect different port 
size, screened traveller volume and mode of travel. Port 
2 could not use API and relied on travellers being asked, 
and reporting, whether they had been to an affected 
country. One focus group per port was conducted with 
screeners from the same port to enable participants to 
recall collective experiences.
Participant recruitment and consent
Invitations and information sheets were posted or 
emailed to potential participants. To achieve a sample 
with maximum variation in views we used a purposeful 
sampling approach. Local screening managers organ-
ised focus groups with screeners and ensured diversity 
in relation to: experience of screening travellers within 
each category of risk, professional backgrounds and role 
within the process (eg, clinical and non-clinical roles) 
and gender. PHE and military databases of screened trav-
ellers were used to sample participants based on: port of 
entry, gender, category of risk and development of EVD 
signs and symptoms either at, or post, screening. Trav-
ellers who had returned from affected countries prior 
to the introduction of screening were selected using 
the same criteria from the PHE Health Protection (HP) 
Zone database. A sample framework was devised based 
on the stated variables, and travellers were then selected 
at random using the ‘sample’ command in Stata V.13.1. 
Travellers who declined to participate or did not respond 
after a maximum of three invitations were replaced by 
someone randomly sampled with similar characteris-
tics. In total, 73 travellers were invited to interview (14 
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prescreening and 44 postscreening by the research team, 
and 15 directly by the military).
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
data collection
The interview topic guide used with travellers who 
returned prescreening explored whether they felt 
informed about actions to take if they felt unwell. Topic 
guides for screeners and screened travellers similarly 
allowed comparison and exploration of the perceptions 
of the purpose and implementation of the screening 
process, barriers and facilitators to following the protocol 
(screeners only), potential improvements and reactions 
to screening (appendix A and B). Travellers were also 
asked about the impact on their knowledge, willingness 
to adhere to advice and behaviour. All interviews and 
Table 1 Category of risk description
Category of risk Description Public Health England recommended actions
Category 0 Individuals who have not visited an EVD affected 
area and have had no contact with EVD or an 
EVD infected individual.
Reassure and provide written and verbal 
information.
Continue normal activities.
Category 1 Individuals who have visited an EVD affected area 
but had no direct contact with an EVD infected 
individual or been exposed to any other high-risk 
event. This category also included those working 
in laboratories assured to be operating to a UK 
standard.
Reassure and provide written and verbal 
information.
Advise to take temperature if feeling unwell and 
phone 111 if ≥37.5°C.
Continue normal activities.
Category 2 (low-risk 
exposure)
Individuals having direct (close) contact with an 
infected person or their body fluids but who did 
not have direct physical contact during clinical 
care and had no known breaches of protective 
equipment/clothing during this contact.
Reassure and provide written and verbal 
information.
For 21 days following last exposure:
 ► Self-monitor and record temperature and 
symptoms twice daily and report if feeling unwell 
and/or temperature≥37.5°C.
 ► Travel – no restrictions.
 ► Normal activities except:
 – Postpone non-essential medical or dental 
treatment (including vaccination), and inform 
healthcare provider of contact if any essential 
treatment needed.
If reluctant to comply with recommendations, 
consider actions on a case-by-case basis.
Category 3 (high-risk 
exposure)
High-risk individuals who had direct contact with 
symptomatic infected individuals and potential 
exposure to bodily fluids including breaches to 
protective equipment/clothing or had worked 
in a laboratory not assured to be working to UK 
standard.
Reassure and provide written and verbal 
information.
For 21 days following last exposure:
 ► Self-monitor and record temperature and 
symptoms twice per day and report to 
designated person by noon daily. If there is 
inability to take temperature a face-to-face 
arrangement will be made with relevant health 
services.
 ► Continue normal activities (while no symptoms) 
except:
 – Local travel only.
 – If a healthcare worker, no patient contact for 
21 days.
 – Postpone non-essential medical or dental 
treatment (including vaccination) and inform 
healthcare provider of contact if any essential 
treatment needed.
 – Do not share toothbrushes or razors.
 – Use barrier contraception or avoid 
unprotected sex for 21 days.
If reluctant to comply with recommendations, 
consider actions on a case-by-case basis.
Adapted from public health guidance ‘Ebola: public health recommendations for asymptomatic contacts’ https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/ebola-public-health-recommendations-for-asymptomatic-contacts.
EVD, Ebola virus disease.
4 Kesten JM, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000788. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-000788
BMJ Global Health
focus groups were digitally recorded. Data collection and 
analysis occurred concurrently to allow for consideration 
of the adequacy of the sample size. The decision to end 
data collection was informed by factors relating to the 
concept of ‘information power’: the breadth of the aim, 
the sample specificity (characteristics of the participants 
relating to the phenomenon under study), quality and 
depth of the interview data and the analysis approach 
which, in this evaluation, did not aim to capture the 
entire range of experiences but present sufficient infor-
mation to explore perceptions of screening.8 Addition-
ally, pragmatic considerations of resources including 
time and availability of screeners guided the decision.
Analysis
Audio recordings were fully transcribed and anonymised. 
Data were analysed using the framework method,9 
supported by QSR NVivo V.10 software. After data famil-
iarisation, codes identifying key issues within the data were 
assigned to three transcripts. Initial codes were discussed 
by JMK and SA and refined to produce a coding frame-
work, which was applied to the remaining transcripts and 
revised in response to new information. Coded data were 
inserted into a matrix in NVivo, which plotted the codes 
against each participant, condensing the volume of data 
with a summary capturing the meaning.
resulTs
Participants
Table 2 details the characteristics of 24 screeners who 
participated in four focus groups. A recruitment rate 
cannot be presented for screeners as focus groups were 
organised by local screening managers and in ports 1 
and 2 depended on who was available on the day. No 
one declined to participate directly to the researcher. 
The average length of focus groups was 81 min (range: 
53–103 min). Twenty-three (31.5% recruitment rate) 
travellers participated in interviews (mean 36 min, range: 
20–57 min) (table 3). Two travellers declined to partici-
pate citing the length of the interview and being too busy 
as reasons; the remaining 51 either did not respond to the 
invitation or the email failed to deliver. Of the 15 invited 
directly by the military, no reason for non-participation 
was received by the research team and no screeners 
contacted the research team to decline participation.
Three themes with illustrative quotes are presented 
below to reflect the range of views from participants.
Context
Screening was established in a short timescale under 
challenging circumstances and the process was refined 
over time.
You have to remember it is an evolving thing. So initially 
we were all in a bit of a situation I think but over a peri-
od things started improving in all spheres actually. Port 1, 
screener 2
Although the screening protocol was standardised, 
implementation was dependent on the port context. 
Ports varied in relation to facilities, identification 
processes, disruption to the traveller journey caused by 
the process (ie, distance between facilities and border 
control/luggage collection), duration of the process and 
volume of screened travellers.
screeners experience of the programme
Ensuring adequate staffing levels was initially chal-
lenging, in part due to the unpredictable volume of trav-
ellers. Over time, the proportion of PHE staff seconded 
to the programme teams became more robust. Screeners 
in ports 1 and 2 reported variable degrees of original 
line managerial support for screening involvement.
In the beginning it was a lot of different staff day in and day 
out and I think now in the past couple of months I think 
a lot of us have come on secondment (…) You’re here all 
the time so you know the process. So when you get people 
who haven’t been for a couple of months you can say ‘Ev-
erything’s the same’ or ‘We do this now’. Port 1, screener 4
Given the diverse background of screeners, the rele-
vance of training content was variable. In two ports, 
screeners felt that there was a lack of clarity on the risks to 
screeners including what screeners should do to protect 
themselves if they were exposed to a suspected EVD case.
Despite recognising procedural modifications as 
improvements, the dynamic nature of the programme 
made keeping up to date with the procedures challenging.
One of the most stressful things was all the paperwork ac-
tually and you know thinking am I catching up, have I read 
everything, am I update on the different versions? Port 2, 
screener 2
Negative aspects of screening related to: the impact on 
the screeners’ routinely employed roles; difficult inter-
actions with passengers; perceived pressure concerning 
Table 2 Focus group screener participant characteristics
Characteristic Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Total
Gender
Male 1 2 1 1 5
Female 7 5 4 3 19
Screening role*
Shift manager 1 1 – – 2
Operational lead – 1 1 2 4
Overseeing role – – 1 1 2
Non-clinical 
screener
– – 1 1 2
Clinical: screener/
senior lead
4 4 – – 8
Non-clinical support 3 1 3 – 7
Governance/health 
and safety role
– – 1 1 2
Overall total 8 7 5 4 24
*Some screeners held more than one role.
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the identification of positive EVD cases; and autonomy to 
adapt the process. In contrast, collaborating with internal 
(eg, different PHE departments) and external bodies 
(airport personnel including Border Force) was a posi-
tive aspect of delivering the programme.
screening purpose and experiences
Comparison of the formally documented objectives of 
the screening process to the perceptions of those who 
experienced it can help to understand the delivery of, 
and response to, the screening process.
Protection or politically driven?
Screeners and most travellers described screening as 
intending to protect the public and prevent the spread 
of EVD in the UK.
I do think there was a genuine desire to keep people safe 
but also psychologically I think it’s important that you 
Table 3 Ebola screening evaluation traveller participant characteristics
Participant characteristic N
Gender
  Male 14
  Female 9
Occupation/employer
  Healthcare provider (non-military) 3
  Military medical 4
  Military non-medical 3
  Journalists (eg, correspondent, producer and camera person) 4
  Retired 1
  Other non-medical (eg, engineer and heavy plant fitter) 2
  Non-medical response to Ebola outbreak (eg, epidemiologist, humanitarian 
worker and nutritionist)
6
Returned to UK prescreening (before 14 October) as well as postscreening 11
Number of times screened on entry to UK
  0 (returned prescreening only) 1
  1 13
  2 or more 9
Port of entry (note: some travellers had used more than one port of entry)
  Port 1 19 (including 5 military travellers)
  Port 2 3 (including 1 military travellers)
  Port 3 4
  Port 4 2 (both military travellers)
  Port 5 (not originally a sampled port but travellers had been screened here) 2
Category of risk
  No category given as only returned prescreening 1
  1 15
  2 1
  3 2
  Could not remember 4
Signs and symptoms present at either port of entry or during 21-day incubation period
  Yes 10
  No 13
Referred to secondary care
  No 16
  Yes – directly from port 2
  Yes – during 21-day incubation period 5
Total 23
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know, we are seen to be doing something. Traveller 7, pre-
screening and postscreening, ports 1 and 2
However, screeners viewed the introduction of 
screening as driven by political concerns rather than 
empirical evidence. A small number of travellers did not 
believe that screening could protect the UK population. 
Instead, screening was viewed as ‘over cautious’ (trav-
eller 14, male, prescreening and postscreening, port 1), 
‘window dressing’, an ‘umbrella hoisting exercise’ (traveller 6, 
male, prescreening and postscreening, port 1) and polit-
ically driven.
It was just a political move, it wasn’t backed by health pro-
fessionals. Port 1, screener 4
Categorising risk of EVD exposure
Screening was described by all screener groups and some 
travellers as categorising travellers in relation to their 
level of risk, based on self-reported behaviours performed 
while in an affected country.
[Travellers] don’t have a good idea of what their risk is. 
They know that they have done this or done that but they 
don’t know how much that activity puts them at risk. So we 
are an expert who assess their activity and say ‘You are at a 
high risk or low risk or very low risk’ and give them appro-
priate advice which I’m sure many people wanted. Port 1, 
screener 2
The screening questionnaire was described by screeners 
and travellers as in-depth and appropriate but was also 
criticised as limited by its reliance on self-reporting. Jour-
nalists commented that the questions appeared to be 
designed for HCWs and were unable to capture some of 
their behaviours such as observing burials rather than 
funerals.
The questions are very basic and it would be very easy for 
you if you did not want to be held up or put in quarantine 
to just tick ‘no’ to everything, ‘no I’ve not been to a fu-
neral, no I’ve definitely not got Ebola’ and as long as your 
temperature wasn’t raised at that point, which you could 
lower by taking Ibuprofen if you so wished, or you may not 
be in that stage of incubation, you could quite easily pass 
through the screening. Traveller 3, prescreening and post-
screening, ports 1 and 2
Travellers generally perceived risk categorisation as 
useful, and discussing the questionnaire responses with a 
screener was considered valuable when the risk category 
was unclear or if travellers wished to be recategorised. 
Screeners were also able to help travellers who found 
questionnaire completion challenging due to extreme 
tiredness.
I said ‘well you know, the way I’ve answered these ques-
tions, yes I suppose I would be lowest [category of risk] but 
I think you should probably bump me up the scale sim-
ply because you know, I have been into the cemeteries as 
they’re burying Ebola victims, you know, I was sitting there 
filming, I’ve been you know fairly close to people who are 
likely to have had Ebola being collected from the streets of 
Sierra Leone, you know, I’ve been into treatment centres – 
although I haven’t actually gone to the very centre of them, 
we have had cameras that have gone in which I’ve then had 
contact with (…) I think I should probably be a bit higher 
up’ and I think in the end they said ‘oh alright, why not’ 
and then I think I was a 2. Traveller 17, postscreening, port 
1
However, there was a general perception by screeners 
that risk categories were less useful for HCWs who had 
prior knowledge of EVD.
Identifying possible EVD signs and symptoms
Most travellers and screeners in port 3 felt that screening 
aimed to identify individuals displaying EVD signs and 
symptoms.
There is the actual ‘let’s see if we can’t catch people who 
are infected before they go off and infect people’. Traveller 
7, prescreening and postscreening, ports 1 and 2
However, several travellers thought identifying individ-
uals with symptoms was unlikely.
In terms of the risk and incubation period and stuff like 
that, in terms of actually being able to travel while you’re 
sick, like the chances of someone actually displaying symp-
toms at screening is small. Traveller 22, prescreening and 
postscreening, ports 1, 2 and 3
Furthermore, port 2 screeners and one traveller felt 
the process should not be called ‘screening’, because it 
was unable to confirm the presence or absence of EVD. 
Indeed, using temperature measurements to screen was 
not seen as evidence based by some travellers and a small 
number of travellers raised issues relating to the accuracy 
of the thermometer readings due to the type of ther-
mometer and the ‘non-touch’ method whereby screeners 
placed the thermometer into the ear without making 
skin-to-skin contact with the traveller. However, the latter 
is recognised as a valid method of taking temperature.
I think screening is not the right word because it’s about 
getting people into the system rather than actually check-
ing whether people have got Ebola. Port 2, screener 7
Referral to NHS if signs and symptoms identified
Screeners and travellers described screening as aiming 
to ensure appropriate specialist assessment for those 
displaying signs and symptoms.
To ensure that if a person is identified who’s at…. who’s 
symptomatic, then….systems were to be set that that per-
son could be safely transported to the [name of hospi-
tal]. Port 3, screener 1
However, delayed transfers to secondary care were 
reported by travellers and screeners, and a small number 
of travellers disagreed with transfer decisions. Screeners 
were mostly considered by travellers as calm and sympa-
thetic when dealing with travellers with signs and symp-
toms, but one traveller described a screener as panicking.
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He took my temperature and it shot right up, it was pretty 
high by then, and he… you could see that he basically shat 
himself!! Ha-ha… and then I was taken away into a smaller 
room, and then a doctor came in – she asked me loads 
of questions, took my temperature again but she had no 
protection on, then she disappeared for 20 min, and then 
came back, and said I could go – which to my mind was 
the wrong thing to do, I would have thought I should have 
been carted off to hospital there and then. Traveller 16, 
prescreening and postscreening, ports 1 and 5
Raising awareness of appropriate actions and advice provision
Screeners and travellers identified the aim of screening as 
raising awareness of the appropriate actions to take should 
EVD signs and symptoms develop including using the NHS 
telephone helpline rather than going directly to hospital. 
Although several travellers talked about screening providing 
such practical advice, most did not feel they gained new 
knowledge and the evidence base for advice to restrict travel 
for asymptomatic individuals was questioned.
We had like leaflets that…it was all quite basic stuff like 
about the Ebola outbreak so I guess that most people prob-
ably knew more than the PHE guys about it if they’d been 
living and working it. Traveller 22, prescreening and post-
screening, ports 1–3
We appeared to have science at the start of this which 
suggested that unless you were leaking body fluids, you 
were no danger to anybody, and yet here we are speaking 
to somebody who’s just come back from Sierra Leone 
whose chance even as a red zone worker of contracting 
the disease was vanishingly low, that you now cannot travel 
on public transport in case you infect anybody. Traveller 6, 
prescreening and postscreening, port 1
Reassurance?
All screener groups, and some travellers, described 
screening as being implemented to reassure travellers 
and the public. Although screeners recognised the low 
risk posed to the public, addressing risk perceptions and 
providing reassurance was viewed as an important function.
It’s a public confidence thing, and so I guess that the pur-
pose is to protect us and the purpose is to be seen to be 
protecting us. Traveller 7, prescreening and postscreening, 
ports 1 and 2
However, port 2 screeners identified a mismatch 
between the public’s perception and the reality of what 
screening could achieve. This gave rise to concerns that 
if a positive case was not detected the public would think 
screening had ‘failed’.
There seems to be a bit of a gap between the public re-
assurances because the public think that we’re checking 
whether or not anyone’s got Ebola. I suppose actually we 
are just putting people on a system and following them up. 
So then if somebody gets Ebola then people think we’ve 
failed. Port 2, screener 7
A small number of HCWs and non-HCWs described 
reassurance from screening as personal or for family, 
friends, colleagues or the wider public.
That [letter] PHE sent, saying ‘you are Category 1, you are 
not seen as a risk, you can continue your life as normal, 
your normal duties’ – that was a massive help, because 
there was so much fear here at that time and I remember 
coming back and people being quite worried about being 
close to me! So having that piece of paper was, I almost 
kind of had it stamped to my forehead! To say that ‘look 
I’ve been screened, it’s fine.’ Traveller 9, prescreening and 
postscreening, ports 1 and 2
In contrast, one traveller asserted that he and his family 
relied on his own awareness, rather than the screening, 
for reassurance.
Screeners and a small number of travellers perceived 
some other travellers to be anxious about screening. Foreign 
nationals, particularly West Africans, were perceived to find 
the process more intimidating than British nationals due to 
the uncertainty about the process, the stigma of EVD and 
wariness about whether screening related to immigration 
processes. Segregating travellers for screening was thought 
by some screeners and travellers to give the impression 
that they had been detained by immigration, and a few 
travellers found the identification process and handling by 
Border Force officials stigmatising.
We know what we’re going to do but they don’t know what 
we are going to do, so they are a bit anxious. Port 1, screen-
er 2
Inconvenience?
Despite the intention to reassure, screening reportedly 
led to some annoyance among travellers. All screener 
groups described travellers as wanting to get through 
the process quickly and displaying annoyance at delays. 
Almost half the travellers described annoyance about 
the delay to their journey and suggested that similar 
processes in the future should avoid this by ensuring 
sufficient staffing levels; however, the other half viewed 
the delay as acceptable and screening as efficient.
The whole thing for me ran smoothly it was only a 5–10 min 
process, you know, it didn’t delay me. Traveller 11, post-
screening, port 3
Screeners in all groups provided examples of negative 
responses to multiple screening occasions, caused by the 
discontinuation of direct flights, for example, screening 
on both exit and entry for a single journey and on stopo-
vers, and multiple screening during the 21-day incubation 
period.
Participant 4: They were [name of country] diplomats 
who’d been screened here 2 days ago and had travelled to 
[European city] on business and had come back into Port 
1. And because our procedure that we have been passed 
down from above … is that they have to be rescreened….
Participant 3: I’d be fed up at that.
Participant 4: And (…) I’m not clinical staff, you know, I 
struggle to understand it from the beginning but I’ve asked 
clinical staff who work on that front line basis with those 
travellers who don’t agree with it either. Port 1, focus group
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Monitoring system and adherence to advice
Screening involved monitoring the temperature of cate-
gory 3 travellers throughout the potential incubation 
period, enabling early isolation and treatment if any trav-
ellers developed symptoms. The appropriateness of this 
process was questioned by travellers because they were 
already motivated to report signs and symptoms. Indeed, 
some screeners felt that HCWs should be allowed to take 
responsibility for protecting themselves and the public. 
Despite this, travellers reported adhering to screeners’ 
advice – monitoring their symptoms and adhering to 
PHE recommended actions appropriate to their category 
of risk (eg, not taking public transport). However, a small 
number of travellers described being unsure when to 
report signs and symptoms and some viewed screening 
and related restrictions on return to the UK as a poor way 
to treat HCWs.
[The monitoring process is] intrusive and, (…) paternalis-
tic and patronising because, (…) as a HCW, I’m not going 
to be so cavalier about my own health and the health of 
my family or the nation that if I suddenly started to feel ill, 
having been in contact with an Ebola patient, I wouldn’t 
have thought, ‘Ooh, perhaps I’d better talk to somebody’. 
So the fact that we then sort of are made to take our tem-
peratures and are made to ring somebody up to say that 
we’re feeling well, to be perfectly honest, I really think that 
was a complete waste of time. Traveller 6, prescreening and 
postscreening, port 1
Acceptability of screening
Most travellers felt that screening was acceptable and, 
several travellers commented that familiarity with temper-
ature checking while in West Africa, contributed to the 
acceptability of UK screening. Despite some negative 
responses, most screened travellers were also described by 
screeners as accepting and valuing the process. Screeners 
suggested that returning HCWs were broadly supportive 
of screening even though it was not expected to have 
any direct impact on them, although those with higher 
risk exposures were described by screeners as being less 
receptive to screening than those at lowest risk.
A huge vast majority of people have been really receptive 
and have really welcomed. (…) So I think from a public 
health safety perspective it’s been very, very valued erm, 
not only from people in the UK but from people coming 
in as well. Port 1, screener 3
dIsCussIon
This paper presents an exploration of screeners and trav-
ellers perceptions of the UK EVD port of entry screening 
programme. The findings highlight ways to enhance the 
acceptability of similar initiatives in the future. Screeners 
and travellers felt that the screening process served 
diverse functions consistent with the stated objectives 
of the programme, although there were some tensions 
around its intended purpose and actual perceived 
benefits. Screening was seen as providing public health 
guidance and advice, which was generally appreciated 
by travellers and was considered by both travellers and 
screening staff as reassuring for the public. However, its 
effectiveness as a ‘screening’ service to identify undiag-
nosed EVD cases was questioned, consistent with national 
scientific debate10 and technical guidance11 at the time. 
There was a degree of frustration arising from the incon-
venience caused.
screening process and improvements
We and others12 highlight the responsive and evolving 
nature of screening, due in part to the short timescale 
prior to implementation and lessons learnt, for example, 
from instances of inadequate staffing. If a similar process 
is to be considered for other public health emergen-
cies, then formal plans should be developed taking into 
account the lessons from this outbreak. It is also impor-
tant to build in flexibility that can respond to the availa-
bility of appropriate facilities, the nature of the threat13 
and factors that may affect acceptance and perception of 
risk.14 15
We highlight accounts of frustration caused by multiple 
screening episodes in one journey. Previous research 
suggests that detection of symptomatic travellers through 
exit screening—requiring international collaboration—
may be a beneficial approach. Nonetheless, there are 
limitations in this approach, notably the risk of passen-
gers becoming symptomatic during travel, challenges 
in monitoring passengers through diverse routes of 
travel and individual countries duty to protect their citi-
zens. Furthermore, experiences of delayed transfers to 
specialist care highlight a need to develop and exercise 
plans for the management of high-consequence infec-
tious diseases including the prompt and safe transfer of 
symptomatic persons from ports.
Screening was dependent on the ability to identify 
eligible travellers; the systems that support this have 
limitations and ways to facilitate and improve the iden-
tification of travellers need consideration. Direct flights 
from the main EVD-affected countries to the UK were 
withdrawn resulting in people travelling via alternative 
routes. On arrival to the UK, additional efforts were 
therefore required to identify travellers coming from 
affected countries, but there was the potential for travel-
lers to be missed.10 16 Greater publicised clarity about the 
programme’s objectives may further encourage travellers 
to self-identify. Screening relied on self-reported infor-
mation from travellers who may not have reported the 
presence of signs and symptoms for a number of reasons 
including a perception of journey delays.10
Screener experiences of delivering the programme 
suggest organisational support for internally seconded 
staff involvement is important. Training for similar 
initiatives, if screening is part of the response, should 
be tailored to the experience of attendees, and training 
for managing challenging passenger encounters may be 
necessary.
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Acceptance
This evaluation highlights interesting contradictions 
between programme acceptance and the perceived 
purpose and experience of screening. The process 
of screening appeared to be valued overall and was 
perceived to be primarily for the provision of informa-
tion and reassurance. Some participants considered 
screening was unlikely to identify individuals with EVD 
signs and symptoms, suggesting it was driven by polit-
ical concerns rather than empirical evidence. Indeed, 
the appropriateness of the term ‘screening’ to describe 
the process was queried. Research suggests that if exit 
screening was effective, then screening on entry should 
only identify those travellers who developed symptoms 
during the flight.10 16 Modelling estimated that exit 
screening would identify 35.6% of infected travellers, 
screening after a further 24-hour period would identify 
5.9% of EVD cases, and after a 12-hour period, 3.4% of 
EVD cases.17 In line with estimates for other infections,18 
the positive predictive value of screening for EVD was 
expected to be very low.16 Due to the non-specific symp-
toms of EVD, and the evolving symptom progression, 
screening was expected to produce false-positive and 
false-negative results.12
Acceptance in spite of these limitations, and a degree 
of inconvenience and disruption19 involved, may be 
explained by the sense of reassurance experienced from 
screening. An alternative explanation is that screening 
promoted a false sense of reassurance. Nevertheless, 
our findings suggest that having a screening process was 
appreciated. A study exploring experiences of an EVD 
screening programme in the USA found that screened 
US citizens were less concerned about becoming 
unwell and the onward transmission of EVD than citi-
zens of EVD-affected countries.20 Additional benefits of 
screening could include the identification of persons 
suffering emotional distress who could be referred to 
mental health services.14
Acceptable to whom?
Acceptance of screening by travellers has previously been 
reported.9 In this current evaluation, screening was gener-
ally seen as less relevant and impactful for returning HCWs. 
This contrasts with members of the public or non-health-
care professionals who appeared to value the use of risk 
categories. It is noteworthy that screening was perceived to 
have been introduced in part to reassure the public.
There is some evidence that HCWs may underestimate 
their risk of contracting EVD, and some may overestimate 
their knowledge of the symptoms of disease.21 The require-
ment for category 3 HCWs to report temperature readings 
to PHE was viewed by some as unacceptable and unneces-
sary but may have allowed for more objective assessment 
of the likelihood of disease and provide an opportunity to 
discuss EVD signs and symptoms. A previous evaluation 
suggested that a majority of those monitored do not trust 
their thermometer readings to be accurate.20
Enhancing acceptability
There have been previous reports of stigma associated 
with return from an EVD-affected country,14 15 and moni-
tored persons have reported negative consequences 
including not being allowed to work and being shunned 
by family.20 Screening could potentially provide reassur-
ance and formal permission to continue routine activities. 
To enhance acceptability and prevent stigmatisation, the 
objectives and intended outcomes of screening should 
be clear to staff and travellers, particularly returning 
HCWs. In this instance, this could have included empha-
sising that screening was designed to provide tailored 
advice and information in addition to appropriate access 
to further investigations when needed. A description of 
the programme and increased awareness of the creden-
tials of screeners may have also helped improve accepta-
bility. Involving those likely to be affected by screening—
screeners and travellers—in all aspects of the design 
and implementation of future initiatives is also likely to 
enhance acceptability. Furthermore, acceptability is likely 
to increase through efforts to limit delays to travellers, 
and approaches to develop a more streamlined system 
for frequent travellers should be considered.
Strengths and limitations
This is the first qualitative evaluation of enhanced UK 
EVD screening, which elicited a diverse range of expe-
riences from those delivering and receiving screening. 
The researcher (JMK) conducting most interviews was 
not a PHE employee and was initially unfamiliar with the 
programme, both of which were explained to the partic-
ipants at the beginning of the interview to help ensure 
participant honesty. This also facilitated a critical distance 
in the interpretation of the data. The researcher gained 
familiarity with the research setting and programme by 
observing screening and or the screening set-up in all 
four ports. Focus groups with screeners began approxi-
mately 7 months after the start of screening, which meant 
the screeners had time to adjust to the process.
This study cannot make conclusive statements about 
whether screening achieved its objectives; it focused on 
eliciting accounts from those involved as opposed to more 
objective measures of programme activity. Although a 
purposeful sample of screeners was requested, a limitation 
of this approach was the inability to control this process 
and thereby assess whether a biased sample in relation to 
the perceptions of participants was achieved. Furthermore, 
the screeners may have felt conflicted between offering a 
professional versus personal opinion especially given that 
the focus groups were conducted at the screening site or 
within the screeners working environment. An additional 
useful aspect would be to capture the feelings of stake-
holders involved in the higher level management of the 
programme, who may have given greater insights into 
programme design and implementation decision making 
processes, though they contributed to the design of the 
study and the drafting of the paper. It is possible that the 
travellers who were willing to participate may have held 
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stronger views on screening than those who refused, or vice 
versa. Participants may have also felt reluctant to provide 
honest accounts to the researcher due to concerns about 
confidentiality and the researcher’s level of independence 
from PHE, despite this being stressed at the beginning of 
the interview. The recruitment rate for travellers (31.5%) 
is relatively low but not unexpected given the approach 
method relied on written invitation only and the time 
elapsed since screening, and only three participants were 
assigned risk category 2 or 3. Therefore, the participants’ 
views may not reflect all those screened. Traveller experi-
ences may be subject to recall bias given a variable amount 
of time since screening and reports of extreme tiredness 
during screening. However, as the findings demonstrate a 
range of positive and negative experiences and patterns of 
commonalities as well as divergent views, these biases are 
expected to be minimal.
ConClusIons
According to travellers and screening staff, the UK EVD 
screening programme was acceptable and was perceived 
to be effective at assessing individual risk and providing 
information and advice to travellers according to that 
risk. In future, if similar programmes are being consid-
ered, it is important that there is clarity as to the objec-
tives of screening and efforts are made to streamline 
processes and minimise disruption. Any future screening 
programme should be tailored to the nature of the 
threat posed, be developed with close involvement of key 
recipients and consider the specific needs of healthcare 
workers taking part in the humanitarian response as well 
as general travellers.
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